The importance of sensing one's movements in the world for the sense of personal identity by Haselager, W.F.G. et al.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/102960
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.
  
RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI FILOSOFIA E PSICOLOGIA 
DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2012.0001 
 
ISSN 2039-4667, E-ISSN 2239-2629  
Vol. 3 (2012), n. 1, pp. 1-11 
 
 
The Importance of Sensing One’s Movements  
in the World for the Sense of Personal Identity 
Willem Ferdinand Gerardus Haselager,  
Mariana Broens, & Maria Eunice Quilici Gonzalez 
 
Articolo pubblicato su invito, ricevuto l’11 ottobre 2011, accettato il 5 dicembre 2011 
 
 
 
█ Riassunto  L’importanza della percezione dei propri movimenti nel mondo per il senso dell’identità personale -  
Nell’ambito della filosofia e delle scienze cognitive l’attenzione dedicata al problema dell’identità personale è 
stata rivolta quasi esclusivamente sul cervello. È nostra convinzione che questo abbia di conseguenza portato 
a trascurare il ruolo del corpo e dei movimenti corporei nel mondo, impoverendo la comprensione del modo 
in cui gli esseri viventi sviluppano il senso della loro identità. Esamineremo quindi l’importanza del percepire 
i propri movimenti per lo sviluppo di un senso del sé di natura basilare e di carattere non-concettuale. Più in 
dettaglio, noi sosteniamo che all’origine del senso del sé vi sia la capacità di avvertire la propria motilità 
spontanea. È a partire da questo elemento che l’organismo giunge a sviluppare un senso del “mi muovo” e, 
infine, del “posso muovermi”. La propriocezione e le cinestesi sono elementi essenziali in questa dinamica. Al 
contempo, sulla scia di Gibson, noi pensiamo che la percezione del sé e dell’ambiente procedano inevitabil-
mente di pari passo, diversamente da quanto sostiene la tradizionale dicotomia tra i cosiddetti sensi interni 
ed esterni. Prenderemo in esame una distinzione tradizionale tra due aspetti del sé corporeo: il senso del 
proprio corpo e l’immagine del proprio corpo. A nostro avviso questi due aspetti colgono elementi differenti 
del senso del sé e sosterremo nello specifico che il senso del proprio corpo svolge un ruolo di fondamentale 
importanza per il nostro senso del sé di carattere non-concettuale. Tenteremo infine di indicare alcune con-
seguenze di questa posizione per la ricerca nel campo delle scienze cognitive, in particolare nel campo della 
robotica, esaminando un caso di assenza di propriocezione, nella convinzione che questo costituisca un pas-
so in avanti nella comprensione del modo in cui gli esseri viventi agiscono nel mondo, ossia grazie al possesso 
del senso del sé. 
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█ Abstract  Within philosophy and cognitive science, the focus in relation to the problem of personal identi-
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ty has been almost exclusively on the brain. We submit that the resulting neglect of the body and of bodily 
movements in the world has been detrimental in understanding how organisms develop a sense of identity. 
We examine the importance of sensing one’s own movements for the development of a basic, nonconceptual 
sense of self. More specifically, we argue that the origin of the sense of self stems from the sensitivity to spon-
taneous movements. Based on this, the organism develops a sense of “I move” and, finally, a sense of  “I can 
move”. Proprioception and kinesthesis are essential in this development. At the same time, we argue against 
the traditional dichotomy between so-called external and internal senses, agreeing with Gibson that percep-
tion of the self and of the environment invariably go together. We discuss a traditional distinction between 
two aspects of bodily self: the body sense and the body image. We suggest that they capture different aspects 
of the sense of self. We argue that especially the body sense is of great importance to our nonconceptual 
sense of self. Finally, we attempt to draw some consequences for research in cognitive science, specifically in 
the area of robotics, by examining a case of missing proprioception. We make a plea for robots to be 
equipped not just with external perceptual and motor abilities but also with a sense of proprioception. This, 
we submit, would constitute one further step towards understanding creatures acting in the world with a 
sense of themselves. 
KEYWORDS: Self; Personal Identity; Proprioception; Movement; Body. 
 
 
  
█ Introduction 
 
WE SUGGEST THAT IN RELATION TO the 
problem of self and identity the moving body 
has received too little attention. We will focus 
on the importance of sensing our bodily move-
ments in the world for the establishment of 
our nonconceptual sense of identity and self. 
We will argue that this nonconceptual self is 
more basic than the reflexive, conceptualized, 
consciously experienced self that is the prima-
ry focus of philosophy and most of cognitive 
science. We will attempt to provide some rea-
sons which explain why it could be important 
for robotics to incorporate these ideas. 
 
█ The problem of identity and the self  
 
In a well-known book on personal identity, 
John Perry1 reviewed the problem of identity 
as it has been discussed by the likes of John 
Locke,2 Joseph Butler, Thomas Reid, David 
Hume, Sydney Shoemaker and Thomas Na-
gel, to name but a few. As he puts it the main 
technical problem confronting a theory of 
personal identity is how to answer questions 
regarding the relation that obtains between 
events or stages in order for them to belong to 
the same person.3 In the history of Western 
philosophy, the problem of identity has main-
ly been a problem regarding the criteria of 
identity. 
 
█ Identity and brain  
 
Perry’s book starts out by a thought exper-
iment (regarding two persons, yourself and a 
certain Peter Pressher) in which two bodies 
change brains overnight (by means of clever 
neuroscience), or, to put it differently, two 
brains change bodies. As Perry describes it, 
you wake up the next morning, finding your-
self in Peter Pressher’s body, and vice versa. 
Or perhaps, Perry adds, the effect of the brain 
or body-switch would be that you wake up 
“seeming to remember” being Peter Pressher 
(since this is the brain now occupying your 
body), but actually turning out to be yourself, 
merely having delusions about being Peter 
Pressher.4 In both cases, the identity goes where 
the brain goes, the only difference being the 
amount of certainty involved in realizing just 
who you are (i.e. knowing versus seeming to 
remember). Another example of the promi-
nence of the brain in relation to questions 
about the self is provided by Parfit: 
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suppose that my brain is transplanted into 
someone else’s (brainless) body, and that the 
resulting person has my character and appar-
ent memory. Most of us would agree, after 
thought, that the resulting person is me.5 
 
We think that both Perry and Parfit pro-
vide good illustrations of the by now almost 
exclusive attention to the brain in relation to 
consciousness and identity. For another illus-
tration, see Slors who suggests that in its con-
temporary guise, psychological continuity (i.e. 
the traditional hallmark of personal identity) 
is found ultimately to reside in causally con-
nected brain states.6 However, we want to 
suggest that this approach profoundly neglects 
the importance of the sense of one’s bodily 
movements in an environment for the experi-
ence of one’s self and identity. As Bermùdez, 
Marcel and Eilan say many usages of the term 
“self-consciousness” seem to imply an aware-
ness of ourselves as purely psychological enti-
ties. Largely unexplored is the relation of self-
consciousness to bodily awareness.7 
 
█ The body and the nonconceptual self  
 
Over the last two decades things have 
changed, at least a little. One of the theorists 
who is famous for his focus on the role of the 
body in relation to identity and the self (and 
self-consciousness) is Damasio. As he says: 
 
the organism, as represented inside its own 
brain, is a likely biological forerunner for 
what eventually becomes the elusive sense 
of self. The deep roots for the self, including 
the elaborate self which encompasses iden-
tity and personhood, are to be found in the 
ensemble of brain devices [to be found in 
the brain stem, hypothalamus, and basal 
forebrain sections] which continuously re-
present, nonconsciously, the state of the liv-
ing body, among its many dimensions. I call 
the state of activity within the ensemble of 
such devices the proto-self.8 
 
Although we agree with Damasio that the 
living body is an essential “deep root” for the 
self, we think that he too puts too much em-
phasis on the role of the brain. Indeed, we 
think that the body is of primary, not of sec-
ondary importance to the self.  
The body is doing more than just translat-
ing brain output into movements as if it is ex-
ecuting commands. The body does more than 
merely selecting sensory information and 
channeling it back into the brain. Chiel and 
Beer9 provide many examples indicating the 
importance of the body for cognition. For ex-
ample, tendons, connecting muscle to bones, 
are greatly affected by different degrees of 
stiffness of the tendon as well as by the level of 
activation of the muscle. The effect of a mus-
cle contraction, and the body’s response to it, 
are a complex function of the geometric rela-
tions and positions of other muscles and 
joints. Chiel and Beer conclude: «motor neu-
ronal output is transformed significantly by the 
properties of the body».10 
Proprioceptive feedback is fundamental in 
generating normal patterns of motor activity. 
For instance, phasic feedback from stretch re-
ceptors is essential for maintaining normal fly-
ing movements in the locust. The swim inter-
neurons of the leech fire too infrequently to 
provide functional output, but in the presence 
of normal sensory feedback, the firing is at an 
effective rate. The same goes for a model of 
leech crawling: proprioceptive feedback is es-
sential.  
 
In the absence of feedback from an ani-
mal’s own movements, the nervous system 
may not generate meaningful activity pat-
terns for behavior.11 
 
█ The nonconceptual self  
 
Having an identity is having the capacity 
to have “I”-experiences. However, these “I”-
experiences need not require linguistic or con-
ceptual capacities. Indeed, we follow Gal-
lagher12 in suggesting that the moving body 
provides for a minimal self (at times also 
called a nonconceptual or “ecological” self, see 
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Neisser13 and Bermudez14) that is more basic 
than the reflexive, conceptualized, consciously 
experienced self that is the primary focus of 
philosophy and most of cognitive science. 
Therefore, what we would like to do here, 
is to focus on the importance of sensing one’s 
bodily movements in the world for the estab-
lishment of our nonconceptual identity and 
for our awareness of ourselves. Central to our 
thesis is the claim that «movement is at the 
root of our sense of agency».15 We discover 
our identity by moving and by perceiving our 
own movements. Incidentally, by “movement” 
we do not mean motion as a passive conse-
quence of forces as in the case of stones (or a 
fainting person) moving towards the ground 
under the influence of gravity, but active be-
havior. Thus, we use the word “movement” in 
the sense of being instrumental to adjustment 
to the environment.16 
 
█ Moving into your “I”:  
 Proprioception and kinesthesis 
 
The starting point of our investigation is 
formed by the idea of Sheets-Johnstone that 
“move” precedes the “I move” just as this pre-
cedes the “I can move”. As she says: «move-
ment forms the I that moves before the I that 
moves forms movement».17 
It is important to note that the transition 
from “move” to “I move” is a process of dis-
covering our bodies through movement. The 
basis of our identity arises out of these spon-
taneous movements that happen to us before 
we make them happen. It is only at a later stage 
that attention can be focused at controlling 
the movements. 
Of crucial importance to the development 
of the self is a sense that is often overlooked. 
Aristotle identified sight, hearing, smell, taste 
and touch as the five primary senses. Missing 
from this list is the sense of proprioception and 
kinesthesis.18 
According to Stillman,19 Bastian intro-
duced the term kinesthesis in 1880 as referring 
to the body of sensations resulting from or di-
rectly occasioned by movements.20 It is the 
sense of movement by which we are made ac-
quainted with the position and movements of 
our limbs, and by which we can discriminate 
between different degrees of resistance and 
weight inherent in external objects (kinein = 
move, aisthesis = a perceiving). It refers specif-
ically to sense of movement through muscular 
effort.21 
Sherrington introduced the term proprio-
ception (proprius = one’s own, receptio = re-
ceive) for the receptors which lie in the depth 
of the organism, particularly in the muscles 
and their accessory organs.22 These receptors 
excite with changes going on in the organism 
itself (other than pain and temperature) re-
sulting in a sense of amongst others move-
ment and position of the joints. It refers gen-
erally to sense of movement and position, in-
cluding tactile and kinesthetic information.23 
Despite small differences24 between proprio-
ception and kinesthesia, the terms often are 
used interchangeably nowadays. 
The evolutionary beginnings of proprio-
ception are tied to surface sensitivity, indicat-
ing movement in relation to something out-
side.25 The surface sensitivity in prokaryotic 
organisms is basically a tactile sensitivity to 
the physico-chemical environment in which 
the organism moves, responding to what it 
senses.26 Similarly the surface sensitivity in 
eukaryotic forms of life (uni- and multi-
cellular) is in the service of movement.  
Proprioceptors seem to have derived from 
external sensory organs,27 as a result of migra-
tion of formerly external bodily structures. 
The sense of bodily movements evolved from 
its beginnings in tactility into kinesthesia.28 
The sensitivity to movement, posture and 
balance arises at a very early developmental 
stage. Prenatally, the semicircular ear canals of 
the vestibular system start their development 
already in the 4th week. In a rudimentary form 
this system for balance is in place around the 
beginning of the 4th month. Proprioceptors in 
the muscles (muscle spindles) appear at 9 
weeks.29 
The 4th month sees the beginning of reflex-
ive movements. At 24 weeks changes in heart 
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rate in response to sounds can be detected. At 
25 weeks the fetus responds to sound by blink-
ing its eyes or movement of its limbs.30 At the 
fetal stage the receptors in the muscles pro-
vide a sense of position and movement. 
After birth, babies sense their bodies pri-
marily by attending to the bodily feelings of 
movement.31 The awareness of the body arises 
from everyday activities such as sucking, grasp-
ing, kicking, swallowing, crying, turning, 
stretching, reaching, smiling, babbling, 
etc.32 These movements may often seem totally 
unrelated to any obvious self-related purpose 
or control. As Thelen and Smith say: «kicking 
is primarily a manifestation of seemingly non-
specific behavioral arousal».33 Arm movements 
seem even more “self-less”, being less rhythmic 
and more random than the movements of the 
legs.34 Another example of the “move” preceding 
the “I move” is given by Thelen and Fogel who 
indicate that communicative expressions appear 
«in the first weeks and months of life, long be-
fore the infant has control over these expres-
sions».35 It is movements such as these that con-
stitute the basis of a prelinguistic, nonconceptual 
acquaintance with oneself as the center of a 
spontaneous ability to move. Thus, as Sheets-
Johnstone says: we literally discover ourselves in 
movement, we grow kinetically into our bod-
ies.36 In this sense, spontaneous movement is the 
constitutive source of agency, of our sense of 
ourselves as agents, subjects, selves.37 
 
We were apprentices, not would-be mas-
ters of our bodies. An infant is not a mind 
trying to control a body, nor is it an out-of-
control body waiting for a mind to catch 
up with it.38  
 
In the remainder (especially section 6), we 
will at times speak of a body sense that results 
from the proprioceptive sense of the bodily 
processes that regulate posture and movement. 
The body sense can function without concep-
tual reflective awareness. It does not consist of 
a representation (à la Damasio’s proto-self) or 
of a model. It constitutes the nonconceptual 
sensing of the ongoing performances of the 
body as it moves around, interacting with and 
adjusting to the environment. As such, it can be 
contrasted with the body image that is a (some-
times conscious) system of intentional states 
(such as perceptions, attitudes and beliefs) per-
taining to one’s own body. The body image en-
compasses the subject’s perceptual experience of 
his or her own body in combination with a con-
ceptual understanding of bodies in general and 
the person’s emotional attitude towards his or 
her own body.39  
 
█ Against a dichotomy between perception 
of self-movement and environment  
 
Proprioception, then, is essential to the de-
velopment of a sense of self. As Bermudez says: 
  
Somatic proprioceptive information pro-
vides perhaps the most primitive way of 
registering the boundary between self and 
non-self.40  
 
We agree that, evolutionary speaking, 
there seems to be a strong relation between 
the sense of self and agency and having a bodi-
ly boundary. As Damasio indicates: 
 
A simple organism made up of one single 
cell, say, an amoeba, is not just alive but 
bent on staying alive […] If there is no 
boundary, there is no body, and if there is 
no body, there is no organism. Life needs a 
boundary. I believe that minds and con-
sciousness, when they eventually appeared 
in evolution, were first and foremost about 
life and the life urge within a boundary.41  
 
We suggest that this «life urge within a 
boundary» constitutes a rudimentary form of 
agency, a nonconceptual form of self. Indeed, 
Damasio himself suggests that he may be de-
scribing «some of the biological antecedents 
of the sense of self – the sense of a single, 
bounded, living organism bent on maintaining 
stability to maintain its life».42 
However, there is a danger lurking behind 
stressing the importance of a body boundary. 
 Haselager, Broens, & Gonzalez 
 
6 
Our emphasis on the importance of proprio-
ception does not imply that we consider it to 
be unrelated, let alone opposed, to the other 
senses. Indeed we suggest that construing a 
dichotomy between so-called internal and ex-
ternal senses is false. Of course, we do 
acknowledge that proprioception is the sensi-
tivity to changes going on within the organism 
itself, as Sherrington put it. However, we 
agree with Gibson that «perception and pro-
prioception are not alternatives or opposing 
tendencies of experience but complementary 
experiences».43 A dichotomy between internal 
and external perception would be artificial: 
 
proprioception can be understood as ego-
reception, as sensitivity to the self, not as 
one special channel of sensations or as sev-
eral of them […] all the perceptual systems 
are propriosensitive as well as exterosensi-
tive, for they all provide information in 
their various ways about the observer’s ac-
tivities […] information about the self is 
multiple and […] all kinds are picked up 
concurrently.44 
 
Thus, egoreception and exteroreception 
are inseparable,45 self-perception and envi-
ronment-perception go together.46 Perception 
and proprioception continuously, simultane-
ously and interrelatedly circle around the two 
poles of self and environment, they are recip-
rocal processes. As Lombardo indicates, for 
Gibson, proprioception involves knowledge of 
the self (body) within the environment.47  
 
Gibson ties together perception and pro-
prioception: the perception of a stable en-
vironment based on stimulus invariants is 
reciprocal to the proprioception of a mo-
bile observer based on stimulus variants. If 
one breaks down, so does the other. Stabil-
ity is tied to change, where the environ-
ment is the relatively stable “pole” and the 
observer the relatively variant “pole” of 
ecological reality.48 
 
Therefore, we suggest that in relation to 
the self, a body boundary does not imply a 
separation between proprioception and the 
perception of the environment. 
 
█ Implications for robotics  
 and cognitive science  
 
If the above analysis is in the right direction, 
we think that some implications for the field of 
robotics in cognitive science deserve considera-
tion. In the current context we are interested in 
robotics as an aid to our understanding of crea-
tures that act in the world with a sense of self. 
On the basis of the above analysis, we make a 
plea that robotics should not focus exclusively 
on external perception but also incorporate the 
sense of proprioception. Although we are 
aware of the fact that proprioception is not al-
ways excluded from robots, it seems fair to say 
that it is an aspect that has received substantial-
ly less attention from roboticists than percep-
tual-motor abilities.49  
To indicate why this neglect of proprio-
ception is deplorable it may be useful to take a 
look at deafferentation patients who have lost 
all bodily sensation. In terms of the distinction 
introduced above, these patients present cases 
of an impaired body sense.50 The most well-
known patient, Ian Waterman (IW), is deaf-
ferented from below the neck.51 IW can expe-
rience hot, cold, pain and muscle fatigue, but 
he has no proprioceptive sense of posture or 
limb location, and no (light) touch.52 He lost 
his proprioception at 19 due to a viral infec-
tion.53 He described his thoughts after being 
hospitalized at that time as follows: 
 
Turned every two hours like a joint of meat, 
basted with lotions. Unmoving, like a stat-
ue. Mind filled with emotion. Limbs dead to 
the touch, movement impossible. What use 
an active brain without mobility?54 
 
Impressively, IW has learned to walk. He 
has achieved this after 3 years of training, on 
the basis of visual feedback. In order to main-
tain motor control he must conceptualize his 
movements and keep certain parts of his body 
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in his visual field.55 Basically, IW walks and 
moves about on the basis of his body image. 
Without visual feedback he is unable to walk. 
If the light suddenly goes out, he crumples to 
the floor.56 If IW sits and is asked to point to 
his knee with his eyes closed, he can do so with 
some difficulty, on the basis of his memory. If 
his leg is moved, he is no longer able to do so. 
When he writes, he has to pay attention not 
only to holding his pen, but to his body pos-
ture as well.57 
He sleeps with the light on. «If he woke up 
in the dark he would have no idea where his 
body was and would never be able to find the 
light switch».58 IW describes what happened 
when his hands moved out of sight: 
 
I could move my hands a bit, but only if 
they were in vision, and I could control 
them, if I could see them. But as soon as I 
looked away, they would float off, and they 
would do really strange things. I remember 
people sit beside me, and I’d be turning to 
someone the other side of the bed, and the 
arm would wander off and hit someone, or 
it would knock something off the cabinet. 
But it was very frustrating. I just... wasn’t 
aware of these things happening, you 
know. But if I could look and see my 
hands, I could control them.59 
 
It is difficult to get a view on what IW’s loss 
of proprioception has done to his sense of self. 
It is important to realize that IW lived for 19 
years with a completely intact proprioceptive 
sense, and had every possibility to develop a 
complete sense of self. Moreover, he continually 
and consciously uses his body image to remain 
informed about his bodily whereabouts.  
However, IW made a statement that may 
shed some light on how the loss of propriocep-
tion affects the sense of self. When IW is in a 
position where he is unable to see his body for 
a prolonged period of time, he describes his 
sensations as follows: 
 
I feel really quite dizzy. It’s very difficult to 
explain but it’s such a long time since I’ve 
been in that position where, you know, for 
such a long period of time, I haven’t seen 
the rest of me… you get into panic mode, 
you know, you’ve got no feedback coming 
back to you, telling you that you’re safe 
and – and that you’re OK.60 
 
We suggest that the feeling of dizziness 
and the sense of panic are related to a growing 
sense of losing oneself at a very basic, bodily, 
level. It may perhaps be thought of as an expe-
rience of being disembodied. 
A first implication of our analysis is that 
we think that the situation robots without 
proprioception find “themselves” in can be 
compared to the situation of IW. That is, they 
may be equipped with an explicit representa-
tion of their physical selves, a body image, but 
they lack a body sense, allowing them to direct 
their bodies gracefully and without explicit 
and detailed attention. 
From our perspective it is dismaying to read 
the report that NASA has expressed interest in 
how IW uses his fingers because his solutions to 
dexterity problems are similar to the ones they 
use to develop and program robotic limbs.61 
To us this seems to be the least attractive 
way of going about robotics. After all, it is be-
cause of proprioception and the body sense 
that we are able to move as fluently as we do. 
Furthermore, our basic sense of self resides in 
our ability to move. To ignore the importance 
of proprioception and the body scheme is to 
miss a chance for deepening our understand-
ing of our sense of self. Moreover, it is likely to 
lead to the production of movement that is as 
cognitively demanding and as fragile as is the 
case for IW. 
A second implication of our paper is that 
robots could help to improve our understand-
ing of the development of the sense of self, as 
they get to know themselves through perform-
ing spontaneous movements. If our analysis is 
correct, the process of self-discovery through 
movement is important in order to develop a 
sense of self. Studying robots that progress 
from proprioceptively sensed uncontrolled 
moving to more controlled and goal-directed 
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movements may offer insights into the nature 
and function of the seemingly random move-
ments observed in young infants. 
 
█ Conclusion  
 
Cognitive science’s understanding of iden-
tity and the self, we submit, has much to gain 
from a greater attention to the body. The al-
most exclusive focus on the brain precludes a 
clear view of how we move into our “I”. We 
suggest that the proprioceptive sensing of our 
movements in the world constitutes the origin 
of our nonconceptual self. It is the body sense, 
not the body image, that forms the foundation 
of our identity. The field of robotics could 
provide great opportunities to further investi-
gate the fertility of these ideas. 
Of course, much regarding the issue of 
identity and self has been left unsaid. Specifi-
cally, we would like to point out that social in-
teraction is of great importance to the devel-
opment of the self. For instance, the capacity 
of 9 month old infants to interact with others 
sharing, following and directing their atten-
tion,62 constitutes an important social stage in 
the unfolding of the self. 
Secondly, our proprioceptive and kinesthet-
ic expectations (as highlighted in unexpected 
moments in everyday experience, e.g. when we 
lift a surprisingly light suitcase) are worthy of 
our attention. If we didn’t have these expecta-
tions, and if they would not be normally right, 
our sense of ourselves as agents would be com-
promised. As Sheets-Johnstone says:  
 
reliable kinesthetic expectations, like the 
kinesthetic regularities on which they are 
based, are foundational to our sense of 
agency.63  
 
It would be most interesting to investigate 
the relation between these kinesthetic expec-
tancies and Gibson’s notion of affordances 
and Turvey’s notion of effectivities. All the 
more so because these notions emphasize the 
integration of world- and self-perception. 
In all, the sequence from “move” to “I 
move” to “I can move” is shaped by a great va-
riety of factors, encompassing the multiple 
facets that form our selves. In this sense, iden-
tity may perhaps be likened rather to a multi-
tude than to a unity. 
 
█  Notes 
 
1 See J. PERRY, Personal Identity, California Uni-
versity Press, Berkeley 1975. 
2 J. LOCKE, An Essay on Human Understanding 
(1690-1694), edited by P.H. HIDDITCH, Claren-
don Press, Oxford 1975: «to find wherein per-
sonal identity consists, we must consider what 
person stands for;- which, I think, is a thinking 
intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, 
and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking 
thing, in different times and places; which it does 
only by that consciousness which is inseparable 
from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to 
it: it being impossible for anyone to perceive 
without perceiving that he does perceive. When 
we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will 
anything, we know that we do so. Thus it is al-
ways as to our present sensations and percep-
tions: and by this everyone is to himself that 
which he calls self: it not being considered, in this 
case, whether the same self be continued in the 
same or divers substances. For, since conscious-
ness always accompanies thinking, and it is that 
which makes everyone to be what he calls self, 
and thereby distinguishes himself from all other 
thinking things, in this alone consists personal 
identity, i.e. the sameness of a rational being: and 
as far as this consciousness can be extended 
backwards to any past action or thought, so far 
reaches the identity of that person; it is the same 
self now it was then; and it is by the same self with 
this present one that now reflects on it, that that 
action was done» (ivi, section II, chap. XXVII, § 9). 
The only thing that does matter, on Locke’s view, 
is that the person self-consciously appropriates 
actions as its own, e.g. as belonging to the same 
thinking thing. Locke thought that the “soul of a 
prince” might enter and inform the body of a 
cobbler carrying with it the consciousness of the 
prince’s past life, making the cobbler the same 
person with the prince, though perhaps not the 
same man (for, as Locke says: «the body too goes 
to the making of a man») accountable only for the 
prince’s actions (ivi, section II, chap. XXVII, § 15). 
 
The Importance of Sensing One’s Movements 
 
9 
 
3 See J. PERRY, Personal Identity, cit., pp. 9-11. 
4 Ivi, p. 5. 
5 D. PARFIT, Personal Identity, in: «Philosophical 
Review», vol. LXXX, n. 1, pp. 3-27, here pp. 4-5. 
6 See M. SLORS, Two Conceptions of Psychological 
Continuity, in: «Philosophical Explorations», vol. 
I, n. 1, 1998 , pp. 61-80, here p. 64. 
7 Cfr. J. BERMÙDEZ, A.J. MARCEL, N. EILAN, Self-
Consciousness and the Body: An Interdisciplinary 
Introduction, in: J. BERMÙDEZ, A.J. MARCEL, N. 
EILAN (eds.), The Body and The Self, MIT Press, 
Cambridge (MA) 1995, pp. 1-28. 
8 A. DAMASIO, The Feeling of What Happens: Body, 
Emotion and the Making of Consciousness, Vintage, 
London 1999, p. 22. The proto-self is a noncon-
scious collection of representations of the multi-
ple dimensions of the current organism state, to 
be distinguished from the core self (a transient 
but conscious reference to the individual organ-
ism in which events are happening) and the auto-
biographical self (see A. DAMASIO, The Feeling of 
What Happens, cit., p.199). 
9 See H.J. CHIEL, R.D. BEER, The Brain Has a 
Body: Adaptive Behavior Emerges From Interac-
tions of Nervous System, Body and Environment, 
in: «Trends in Neurosciences», vol. XX, n. 12, 
1997, pp. 553-557. 
10 Ivi, p. 553, our emphasis. 
11 Ivi, p. 555. 
12 See S. GALLAGER, Philosophical Conceptions of 
the Self: Implications for Cognitive Science, in: 
«Trends in Cognitive Science», vol. IV, n. 1, pp. 
14-21; S. GALLAGER, Phenomenological and Exper-
imental Research on Embodied Experience, in: T. 
ZIEMKE, J. ZLATEV, R.M. FRANK (eds.), Body, Lan-
guage, and Mind, vol. I, Embodiement, De Gruy-
ter, Berlin 2007, pp. 271-323. 
13 See U. NEISSER, Five Kinds of Self-knowledge, in: 
«Philosophical Psychology», vol. I, n. 1, 1998, pp. 
35-59. 
14 See J. BERMUDEZ, Precis of Bermudez, The Para-
dox of Self-consciousness, p. 20 – URL: http:// 
www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?10.3 
15 M. SHEETS-JOHNSTONE, The Primacy of Move-
ment, John Benjamins, Amsterdam 1999, p. xv. 
16 See T.J. LOMBARDO, The Reciprocity of Perceiver 
and Environment: The Evolution of James J. Gib-
son’s Ecological Psychology, Lawrence Erlbaum As-
sociates, Hillsdale (NJ) 1987, p. 303, who follows 
Gibson. 
17 M. SHEETS-JOHNSTONE, The Primacy of Move-
ment, cit., p. 59. 
 
 
18 Ivi, p. 132; see also p. 137. 
19 See B.A. STILLMAN, An Investigation of the Clin-
ical Assessment of Joint Position Sense, Ph.D. The-
sis, School of Physiotherapy, Victoria, Melbourne, 
Australia 2000 – URL: http://thesis. lib.unimelb. 
edu.au/adt-root/uploads/approved/adt-VU2001. 
0012/public/front.pdf 
20 See H.C. BASTIAN, The Muscular Sense: It’s Na-
ture and Cortical Localization, in: «Brain. A Jour-
nal of Neurology», vol. X, n. 1, 1887, pp. 1-88, in 
particular see pp. 5-6. Related words are: kinetics 
(dealing with forces involved in movements), kin-
ematics (movements). 
21 See M. SHEETS-JOHNSTONE, The Primacy of 
Movement, cit., p. 83. 
22 C. SHERRINGTON, The Integrative Action of the 
Nervous System, Yale University Press, New Ha-
ven, 1906, p. 130. 
23 M. SHEETS-JOHNSTONE, The Primacy of Move-
ment, cit., p. 83.  
24 Bastian regarded the skin receptors as a possible 
source of movement and position sense, whereas 
Sherrington differentiated skin receptors as being 
sources of exteroception from musculoskeletal 
and vestibular receptors (see A. STILLMAN, An In-
vestigation of the Clinical Assessment of Joint Posi-
tion Sense, cit., p. 22). 
25 M. SHEETS-JOHNSTONE, The Primacy of Move-
ment, cit., p. 67. 
26 Ivi, p. 68. 
27 Ivi, p. 71. 
28 Ivi, p. 72. 
29 See S. GALLAGHER, Phenomenological and Ex-
perimental Research on Embodied Experience, cit., 
p.  20. 
30 Ivi, p. 23. Incidentally, the neural development 
of the motor cortex seems to be stimulated by the 
body movements of the fetus itself. Movement 
influences morphology. 
31 See M. SHEETS-JOHNSTONE, The Primacy of 
Movement, cit., P. 56; see also pp. 84-85. 
32 See ivi, p. 134. In terms of the dynamical sys-
tems theory, these spontaneous movements may 
be thought of in terms of the spatial layout of an 
attractor landscape. Infants do not start with a 
completely flat landscape, but their terrain of po-
tential movements is already structured because 
of their intrinsic dynamics (see J.A.S. KELSO, Dy-
namic Patterns: The Self-organization of Brain and 
Behavior, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA) 1995; E. 
THELEN, L.B. SMITH, A Dynamic Systems Ap-
proach to the Development of Cognition and Action, 
 
 Haselager, Broens, & Gonzalez 
 
10 
 
MIT Press, Cambridge (MA) 1994, p.250; M. 
SHEETS-JOHNSTONE, The Primacy of Movement, 
cit., p. 248). 
33 E. THELEN, L.B. SMITH, A Dynamic Systems Ap-
proach to the Development of Cognition and Action, 
cit., p. 78; see also M. SHEETS-JOHNSTONE, The 
Primacy of Movement, cit., p. 266. 
34 Ibidem.  
35 E. THELEN, A. FOGEL, Toward an Action-based 
Theory of Infant Development, in: J.J. LOCKMAN, 
N.L. HAZEN (eds.), Action in Social Context, Ple-
num Press, New York 1989, pp. 23-63, here see p. 
46. See also M. SHEETS-JOHNSTONE, The Primacy 
of Movement, cit., p. 266. 
36 Sheets-Johnstone suggests that we can get a 
sense of these experiences of movement before 
memory and language by attending to purely ki-
netic experiences as in movement improvisation 
and T’ai Chi. In these cases, the meaning of the 
kinetic experience is in the movement itself (see 
M. SHEETS-JOHNSTONE, The Primacy of Move-
ment, cit., p. 151). We have “bare attention” (Bud-
dhism). An interesting aspect that comes to the 
fore is that all that endures of self-movement is a 
reverberating felt sense of its dynamics. There is 
nothing tangible to inspect, nothing audible to 
which to draw nearer, nothing to hold up to the 
light and so on. (see ivi, p. 154). Merce Cunning-
ham (an American ballet-dancer and choreogra-
pher) wrote in 1968: «you have to love dancing to 
stick to it, it gives you nothing back, no manu-
scripts to store away, no paintings to show on walls 
and maybe hang in museums, no poems to be 
printed and sold, nothing but that single fleeting 
moment when you feel alive, it is not for unsteady 
souls» (quoted from M. SHEETS-JOHNSTONE, The 
Primacy of Movement, cit., p. 175). 
37 See M. SHEETS-JOHNSTONE, The Primacy of 
Movement, cit., pp. 136, 138. 
38 Ivi, p. 150. 
39 See S. GALLAGHER, Phenomenological and Ex-
perimental Research on Embodied Experience, cit., 
p. 274. 
40 J. BERMUDEZ, Precis, cit., p. 28. 
41 A. DAMASIO, The Feeling of What Happens, cit., 
pp. 136-137. 
42 Ivi, p. 136. 
43 J.J. GIBSON, The Ecological Approach to Visual 
Perception, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hills-
dale (NJ) 1979, p. 201. 
44 Ivi, p. 115. 
45 Gibson differentiated 6 kinds of proprioception: 
 
 
muscular, articular, vestibular, cutaneous, auditory 
and visual; see T.J. LOMBARDO, The Reciprocity of 
Perceiver and Environment, cit., p. 279. Let us look at 
vision for a moment. As Gibson says: «vision is kin-
esthetic in that it registers movements of the body 
just as much as does the muscle-joint-skin system 
and the inner ear system. Vision picks up both 
movements of the whole body relative to the ground 
and movement of a member of the body relative to 
the whole. Visual kinesthesis goes along with muscu-
lar kinesthesis. The doctrine that vision is exterocep-
tive, that it obtains “external” information only, is 
simply false. Vision obtains information about both 
the environment and the self. In fact, all the senses 
do when they are considered as perceptual sys-
tems». See J.J. GIBSON, The Ecological Approach to 
Visual Perception, cit., p. 183.  
46 J.J. GIBSON, The Ecological Approach to Visual 
Perception, cit., p. 116. 
47 T.J. LOMBARDO, The Reciprocity of Perceiver and 
Environment, cit., p. 227. 
48 Ivi, p. 304; see also p. 323. 
49 See R.A. BROOKS, Cambrian Intelligence: The 
Early History of the New AI, MIT Press, Cambridge 
(MA) 1999; here there is hardly any mention of 
proprioception.  
50 There are cases of an intact body schema in the 
absence of a completely intact body image, e.g.  
unilateral neglect (p. 9). In such cases, patients for 
example fail to dress the left side of their body or 
to comb their hair on the left side, while their left 
side is still functioning motorically (e.g. they can 
walk, button a garment, tie a knot, or use the left 
hand to dress the right side of their body). 
51 Another patient, LG, is deafferentated from be-
low the jaw. LG did not learn to walk, and remains 
in a wheelchair. It is interesting that in the mirror 
drawing task, LG did not need seven tries (which 
is normal) but only 1; see B. AZAR, Why Can’t 
This Man Feel Whether or Not he’s Standing Up?, 
in: «APA Monitor Online», June 1998 (29.6), p. 
4. The proprioceptive feedback that normally in-
terferes with what we are seeing is missing in LG 
and hence did not make the task difficult for her 
as it did with control subjects. Both IW and LG can 
accurately estimate the weight of objects they lift. 
Though normally this is based at least in part on 
the basis of feedback from the stretch of tendons 
and muscles, they use vision: the faster and higher 
their arms move when they pick up an object, the 
lighter it must be. With their eyes open they can 
detect 10% weight differences, with their eyes 
 
The Importance of Sensing One’s Movements 
 
11 
 
closed only 50% (see B. AZAR, Why Can’t This Man 
Feel Whether or Not he’s Standing Up?, cit., p. 3). 
However, we wish to point out that this reported 
score of 50% is still very accurate, given the com-
plete absence of proprioception. The report by 
Horizon speaks of “a loss” of weighing ability. 
52 See S. GALLAGHER, Phenomenological and Experi-
mental Research on Embodied Experience, cit., p. 278. 
53 In 1979, Ian’s condition was called sensory neu-
ronopathy, which means damaged sensory nerves. 
No one had ever recovered. As Herb Schaumburg 
says about Ian: the cells that he’s lost are called 
dorsal route ganglion cells. They’re just big neu-
rons that lie, paired, one on either side of the spi-
nal cord, corresponding to every segment of the 
spinal cord. So there's some thirty-three pairs of 
these things up and down, and they take all the 
sensory impulses, all the sensory information in, 
from your periphery, and feed it into the brain 
(see Horizon – The Man Who Lost His Body, BBC-
Television, 1997 – URL: http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
science/horizon/lostbodytran.shtml). 
54 Horizon – The Man Who Lost His Body.  
55 See S. GALLAGHER, Phenomenological and Ex-
perimental Research on Embodied Experience, cit.,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
pp. 279-279. 
56 B. AZAR, Why Can’t This Man Feel Whether or 
Not he’s Standing Up?, cit., p. 1. 
57 Ivi, p. 10. 
58 J. BERMUDEZ, Precis, cit, p. 24. 
59 Horizon – The Man Who Lost His Body.  
60 Horizon – The Man Who Lost His Body. 
61 See B. AZAR, Why Can’t This Man Feel Whether 
or Not he’s Standing Up?, cit., p. 6; for a particular 
implementation along these lines, see J. JOSEPH, B. 
LUDERS,  Modeling and Simulation of Robot Pro-
prioception from Sensor Data, 2006 – URL 
http://web.mit.edu/luders/www/work/proprio_
paper.pdf; however, for a recent, more promising 
approach, see J. EVERIST, W.-M. SHEN, Mapping 
Opaque and Confined Environments Using Propri-
oception, in: Proceedings of 2009 IEEE International 
Conference on Robotics and Automation, Kobe, Ja-
pan, May 2009 – URL: http://jacobeverist.com/ 
everist2009_mapping_opaque_environments.pdf 
62 See M. TOMASELLO, The Cultural Origins of 
Human Cognition, Harvard University Press, 
London 1999. 
63 M. SHEETS-JOHNSTONE, The Primacy of Move-
ment, cit., p. 145. 
